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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An attempt is made to determine the nature of land market as to how far it 
approximates the ideal of competitive market. It also reviews the farm size, 
efficiency and productivity relationship. The paper is organised in four sections.  
After the introductory section, the literature on past research on land markets in 
Pakistan and other countries is brought together in Section II.  Description of land 
market institutions and changes in the structure of land markets including the pattern 
of ownership and the operational distribution of land and trends in different facets of 
land markets are the subject matter of Section III. Summary and conclusions are 
presented in the concluding section. 
 
II.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature on rural land markets focuses on a wide variety of issues 
including: the relationship between farm size and productivity; land rights; 
constraints faced by small farms; land reforms; land fragmentation; transaction costs; 
the relationship between rent and land prices. To begin with, the debate on the 
subject of farm size and productivity relationship started with Sen’s (1962) seminal 
work using India’s Farm Management Survey Data. Afterwards, a significant 
number of studies have been completed proving or rejecting the claim of the inverse 
relationship between farm size and land productivity in South Asia and some other 
developing countries. The studies using Indian data, which found inverse 
relationship are Sen (1962); Masumdar (1965); Rao (1966); Saini (1971); Bharadwaj 
(1974); Chaddha (1978); Ghose (1979); Bhalla (1979); among others.  The studies 
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which did not find inverse relationship or had inconclusive results are Rao (1967); 
Bhattacharya and Saini (1972); Khan and Tripathy (1972); Rao (1975); Dasgupta 
(1977); Chattopadhyay and Rudra (1976); Saini (1980); Bagi (1981); Deolalikar 
(1981); Rao and Chotigeat (1981); Roy (1981); among others. 
Studies of the type done in India are relatively scarce in other developing 
countries.  The few studies conducted in other countries have also come up with 
mixed results.  In the case of Egypt, Radwan and Lee (1986) support the inverse 
relationship, while Commander (1987) finds no consistent association.  Dyer (1991) 
states that the relation may hold in a relatively backward agriculture but it breaks 
down with the advancements in technology.  Hossain (1977); Berry and Cline (1979) 
and Herdt and Mandac (1981) found that the inverse relationship holds in the case of 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, respectively. 
Studies using efficiency analysis in developing countries also show mixed 
results of the kind found in studies discussed above that have used the size-
productivity relationship to resolve the debate.  In case of India agriculture, Khusro 
(1964); Sahota (1968); Sidhu (1974); Ray (1985); Huang and Bagi (1984) and 
Kalirajan (1981) concluded that productive efficiency did not differ across different 
farm size categories. Yotopoulos, Lau and Sonel (1970); Lau and Yotopoulos 
(1971); Yotopoulos and Lau (1973) and Bagi (1987) found negative relationship 
between farm size and efficiency.  Squire and Tabor (1991); Bravo-Ureta and 
Evenson (1994) and Pinheiro (1992) found no relationship between farm size and 
efficiency in agriculture sectors of Indonesia, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, 
respectively. 
In spite of the pertinent nature of the policy debates, the analysis of the 
relationship between farm sizes and productivity did not attract much attention of the 
researchers in Pakistan.   However, a few studies have been conducted in the past 
dealing with this issue.  The first is that of Khan (1979) using 732 irrigated farms in 
the Indus Basin for the year 1974 and a production function technique incorporating 
a farm size dummy variable concluded that the large farmers get higher output per 
acre.  The study further indicates that per acre use of non-traditional inputs-fertiliser, 
hired labour and farm machinery—is higher on large farms than on small farms.  The 
observed difference is a result of market distortions induced by public policy.  The 
second study by Khan and Maki (1980) uses the same 1974 data set.  It conducts 
analysis for wheat and rice crops only.  It found no significant farm size-based 
difference in efficiency.  However, they reported the existence of increasing returns 
to scale. 
Ali and Flinn (1989) using the profit frontier approach found an average 
economic efficiency of 69 percent for the Basmati rice farmers in Punjab, based on 
the data from Gujranwala district.  Farmers’ education, lack of credit facility, late 
application of fertilisers, and irrigation constraints were considered to be the factors 
accounting for low efficiency.  Ali and Choudhry (1990) found average technical 
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efficiency of about 84 percent with some regional level variations.  Battese, et al. 
(1993) using wheat data from Faisalabad, Attock, Badin and Dir found that technical 
inefficiencies exist in three of these districts that are Faisalabad, Badin and Dir.  The 
study suggests that the adoption of new technology and a good agricultural extension 
system are required to enhance the efficiency of the wheat farmers.  Parikh and Shah 
(1994) found average technical efficiency of about 96 percent in NWFP.  The farm 
level technical efficiency was found dependent upon farmers’ education, credit, age 
and the extent of land fragmentation.  Parikh, Ali and Shah (1995) using cost 
function found an average inefficiency of about 12 percent.  The study also 
concluded that the small farmers were more efficient than the large farmers in the 
study area.  The authors suggested that providing rural education, extension service 
and credit could reduce inefficiency. 
It was the evidence of inverse relationship (between farm size and per acre 
productivity) that provided an empirical support to the policy-makers for reforming 
the agricultural sector in various countries.  Pakistan faces tremendous problems on 
various fronts including social, cultural, institutional and economic.  These problems 
continued to affect the achievable potential growth of the agriculture sector keeping 
it down to its minimum through their depressing effects on land productivity and 
economic efficiency. 
The solution considered for increasing land productivity was to reform the 
feudal land tenure system inherited by Pakistan. Consequently, two land reforms, 
1959 and 1972, took place.  The land reforms have to serve three purposes; increased 
production, efficiency and equity through redistribution of land and security of 
tenure.  However, these reforms did not succeed in changing the status quo in 
Pakistan and thus had no significant impact on production [Naqvi, et al. (1989)]. 
The following explanations have been cited by various studies to account for 
the negative relationship between land size and productivity: 
 • Factor prices so vary between large farms and small farms, that the effective 
prices of land and capital are low for the large farms while the price for 
labour is cheaper for small farms. Thus, small farms are more labour 
intensive i.e. they have high labour to land ratios whereas large farms use 
labour and land less intensively.  
 • Small farms with a lower opportunity cost of labour, can exploit more 
marginal land, cultivate a larger proportion of their land, and as a result, 
achieve higher output and yields. The point regarding the factor price 
differentials between large and small farms is derived from Sen’s1 labour 
market dualism framework where the supply price of family labour is the 
average product of labour and not the marginal product. The marginal 
product of labour (MPL) on the small farms will be lower than on the large 
 
1Amartya Sen (1962) An Aspect of Indian Agriculture. Economic and Political Weekly 14, 243–246. 
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farms. The main qualification to this is where the opportunity cost of labour 
is high (due to the availability of off-farm employment). However, the 
market wage may be discounted for risk and search costs, or the family may 
try to hire out labour but family preferences or unwillingness to share output 
with the hired-out worker, will keep the MPL less than the wage.2 
 • The effective land price may be higher for the small farms because small 
plots of land may have higher unit costs (a greater potential market and 
inconvenience for landowners). Secondly, since land purchase needs credit 
and that large farm owners have better ratings they have cheaper access to 
credit. The real price of land is therefore lower. Differentials in price of land 
reinforce labour cost differentials and lead to labour intensive cultivation and 
a higher output per acre for small farms.  
 • Capital market imperfections reinforce low labour use on the large farms. A 
low effective price of capital leads to substitution of machines for labour. 
The main influence of mechanisation is on substituting for labour rather than 
raising yields.3 Studies show markedly lower labour to land ratios on the 
large farms and this is taken to mean that capital and land market 
imperfections complement the effects of labour market dualism or are not 
strong enough to counteract them.  
 • The holding of land for asset price speculation or for reasons of social 
prestige and or political power is also counted as a possible explanation for 
lower productive activity on the large farms. 
Khan (1979) focuses on productivity differences due to farm size. Using farm 
size data, the study suggests that in Pakistan large farms are relatively more 
productive because of their greater use of  “non-traditional” inputs. The input 
intensity of large farms derives from market distortion induced by public policy.  
Agricultural policy should therefore concentrate on eliminating market distortions, 
by measures like ceiling on land holdings and a wider diffusion of farm extension 
services and credit. 
Chaudhry, et al. (1985) focus on the size-productivity relationship in Pakistan 
during Seventies in the wake of the Green Revolution. The study concludes that the 
traditional inverse relationship between farm size and productivity exists in Pakistan 
precluding the possibility of a positive relationship. The analysis of the study shows 
that the rate of growth of productivity  in the seventies was more pronounced in the 
case of small farmers as compared to the large farmers. The authors are of the view that 
the reasons why the traditional inverse relationship remains intact are higher labour 
input, more intensive land use, greater manorial application, high rates of adoption of 
HYVs and greater irrigated area of the small farmers in relation to the large ones. 
 
2Berry and Cline: Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries (1979). 
3Binswanger (1984). 
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The study concludes, firstly, that in Pakistan the Green Revolution technology 
has basically been scale-neutral in its effects on various classes of farmers. Although 
tractors and tubewells may be physically indivisible, the practice of selling tubewell 
water and the institution of contract-ploughing make them quite divisible in terms of 
flow of their services. Due to this scale-neutrality, the authors recommend that the 
government should increase the emphasis on propagating the cause of these 
technologies. Secondly, it has been argued that the unequal distribution of 
appropriate technologies into social, physical and political environments have been 
biased against the small producers. Given the high levels of productivity of small 
farmers, it is difficult to underestimate the economic importance of a redistributive 
land reforms programme to a rapid growth of agricultural output and the changing of 
the environment in favour of the small farmers. Thirdly, the propagation of the Green 
Revolution technologies and their effects on various classes of farmers depends on 
the prevailing price policy of the  key agricultural inputs and agricultural 
commodities. An adequate supply of the cheap agricultural inputs would suit the 
needs of the small farmers and  would lead to the rapid growth of agricultural output.  
Mahmood and Haque (1981) explore the relationship between farm size and 
output per acre in Pakistan. The study concludes that the observed negative or 
positive correlations between land productivity and the farm size in the case of 
Pakistan are the result of over-aggregation. Land productivity curve is U-shaped; the 
productivity is high on small farms due to intensive labour and irrigation use and on 
largest farms due to capital-intensive inputs. The derived U-shaped curve entails that 
the smallest and largest farm sizes have the highest land productivities, while the 
middle farmers are relatively inefficient. 
As summarised in World Bank’s study of Rural Factor Markets (2004), recent 
econometric evidence in Pakistan suggests relatively small diseconomies of scale in 
physical production. Plot-level regressions of productivity, correcting for plot 
characteristics and some household characteristics (such as tractor ownership and 
number of household workers) suggests a doubling of operated area leads to 10 
percent lower wheat yields (and 13 percent lower rice yields), [World Bank (2002)]. 
Controlling for access to credit, Jacoby and Mansuri (2004) find that as doubling of 
plot area leads to a 12 percent reduction in gross productivity (controlling here for 
access to credit). 
Many theoretical and empirical studies suggest that insecure rights to land 
adversely affects production and investment incentives. However, strong evidence 
linking rights to production and investment is scarce for South Asia despite 
significant regional variation within the Subcontinent. Lin (1992) shows that the 
dominant source of output growth in Chinese agriculture during 1978–1984 was the 
change from collective-team large farms to individual household-based farming 
(despite the often small size of household plots). Feder, et al. (1988) demonstrated a 
link between title ownership on the one hand, and access to credit and land 
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improvements on the other. Strong evidence for the South Asian case is provided by 
Banerjee and Ghatak (1996). Using district-level data, they show that a programme 
of voluntary tenant registration, with registration giving the tenant certain rights, had 
dramatic effects on productivity in West Bengal from the late 1970s onwards. 
The evidence that land rights may affect investment incentives is more 
speculative, though there are abundant theoretical reasons to believe that this is the 
case. Besley (1996) presents three reasons why insecure land rights should effect 
investment incentives: fear of expropriation, credit access and collateral (the key 
mechanism in the Feder, et al., study), and lack of trading opportunities. Basley 
presents evidence that land rights are positively related to investment in two samples 
from Ghana. Evidence of the influence of land rights on investment is scarce in the 
South Asian case; without such evidence we cannot weight the relative importance 
of land rights and wealth in constraining investment. Besley (1996) notes an 
additional possibility: that land rights may be endogenous. Farmers may invest in 
land over which they have insecure title, in order to solidify their claim. If this is the 
case, farmers may find it difficult to make such investments if their incomes are low, 
weakening their claim to title. It  is important that investment be interpreted broadly 
to include the notion of sustainability; to the extent that ongoing deterioration in the 
quality of a field can be traced to private actions (as opposed to externalities such as 
drainage), this should be considered as disinvestments in the field. South Asian 
agriculture  is experiencing an array of environmental problems and we have little 
evidence on the role that the allocation of land rights plays in these problems. 
The literature on constraints faced by small farms argues that despite greater 
apparent efficiency of small farmers, they face greater difficulty in raising their 
profitability or expanding their holding size. Credit constraints appear to be the 
biggest single obstacle but a discriminatory policy regime and poverty have also 
played a major role. If smallholders are more efficient than farmers with large 
holdings in most circumstances, the question then is: why does the land market not 
reallocate land to farmers with smaller holdings? We can also ask why marginal 
farms continue to exist throughout South Asia: one would expect a marginal farmer 
to either expand his plot or exit the agriculture sector completely. It is often stated 
that smallholders face a daunting array of problems; from inadequate farm size, 
access to inputs and services etc.  
The leading constraint faced by smallholders is access to financial markets. 
The evidence from South Asia indicates while there was a vast expansion in 
institutional credit provision to agriculture, little of this credit reached smallholders 
and most disbursement is concentrated on very large farms. This is typically 
attributed to difficulties in collateralising holdings with insecure title (transfer 
rights), or smallholders inability to appropriate the rents from rationed card. It is 
smallholders lack of access to financial markets that underlies their greater degree of 
risk aversion in Binswanger’s study. Binswanger finds that the inability of 
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smallholders to diversify risk is manifested in the choice of non-profit maximising 
portfolios; in this sense, smallholders are less efficient than farmers with large 
holdings. An increase in the assets of smallholders (e.g. land) would enhance their 
ability to absorb risk, and would improve their efficiency. This argument has been 
used to support the case for land reform but of course (other policies (such as 
improved credit market access) could have a similar impact. 
Credit market imperfections can be overcome by interlinked transactions. Bell 
and Srinivasan (1989) find that interlinked transactions are an important 
characteristic of agriculture even in commercialised Punjab, where the “feudal” view 
of such transactions is presumably least tenable. In particular, transactions between a 
farmer and the trader or commission agent to whom he sells his product were very 
common. A related area which ties together land and labour interactions as well as 
constraints faced by smallholders is that of land and demographic interactions. South 
Asia is generally characterised by large family size amongst small-holders and the 
landless. 
Shearer, et  al. (1990) point out that the type of farm that has tended to emerge 
in the liberalised agricultural sectors of  Latin America is the capitalised family farm; 
large enough to overcome capital market constraints but small enough to have 
efficient labour supervision. These farms tend to have high capital-land and capital-
labour ratios and thus absorb little outside labour. Whether this reflects the truly 
efficient outcome or the continued existence of distortions that favour large farms is 
not clear. Kevane (1996) study, presents a model featuring imperfections in land 
rental markets, credit markets, insurance and labour markets and shows that there is a 
possibility of a positive relationship between wealth or size and yields even when a 
supervision constraint alone would favour small farms. The mechanism is as follows: 
wealthier farmers have less need to engage in off-farm labour, so the amount of 
labour available for agricultural production is higher. However, because of rental 
market imperfections, they are unable to fully match this labour with additional land, 
so that labour input per unit land rises for wealthier farmers. He finds that the 
predicted positive relationship between wealth and productivity is indeed present in a 
village in Sudan. 
Hirashima (1996) examines the land market behaviour in South Asia, taking  
the most technological advanced Punjab (both Pakistan and India) as an example. 
According to this study, land market behaviour in terms of the rent-land price ratio or 
the profitability of investment in land cannot be explained by the conventional rent 
theory. To address this issue, the paper explains the market behaviour by 
incorporating the asset effects in addition to the technological effects in agricultural 
production. The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows. First, 
throughout the British period, the R/P ratio had been declining. The movement of the 
ratio even after the post independence period can be regarded as an extension of the 
one observed during the pre-independence period. Second, the analysis confirms the 
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fact that land price has not been the discounted value of the rent as the conventional 
rent theory asserts. The recognition as well as understandings of the asset affects in 
land price formation seems to be crucial. The magnitude of the asset effects is 
hypothesised as a function of the accumulation of social over-head capital and the 
private capital formation of the non-agricultural sectors in the region. And highly 
likely that the asset effects would be much stronger in land price formation than 
technological effects in agricultural production at least in the long run. 
Third, if this argument is valid, it can further be hypothesised that the 
disparity between the rent payers and rent receivers, and even among rent receivers 
with different landownership, and the disparity between regions with different 
accumulation of public and private capital may not be reduced only with 
technological innovation within the agricultural sector through market.  Fourth, the 
R/P ratio in contemporary Punjab has gone down to the extent that it is no more 
possible to buy land for those who do not have initial capital.  It follows, therefore, 
that only those who can afford to wait for the asset effects to be captured in the long-
run, without expecting much return in the short-run, can participate in land market.  
In this situation, the income from the outside sector seems to be the only means for 
the small and marginal farmers or landless non-farm households in villages in Punjab 
to participate in land market. Fifth, with respect to the policy implication of our 
findings, the following four points may be relevant.  First, it is important to recognise 
that the disparity question cannot be answered neither in flow terms (income), nor 
stock terms (asset) alone, but in the dynamic relationship between the two.  Second, 
one of the key areas for reducing disparity is the pattern and direction of public 
investment in social overhead capital in the region.  Therefore, public investment 
should be redirected, if necessary, to minimise the growing disparity among regions.  
Third, it seems to be important to prevent the capital gain from land holding to grow 
by introducing appropriate land tax policy. Fourth, the effort has to be made to 
collect land price data systematically and make them accessible to the public. 
The author is of the view that since the land price data are not published after 
independence both in Pakistan and India, it is difficult to confirm whether or not the 
observed trend of declining rent-land price ratio can be observed after independence.  
The study is based upon the scattered field survey data. Two sets of field survey data 
are available for the Pakistan Punjab. One is the data collected by the author in 1971-
72 from four villages [Hirashima (1978)], and the other by Renkow for the period 
1968-89 [Renkow (1991)]. According to the former study, the average R/P ratio 
came to be 4.1 percent in the case of rent in kind, and 3.5 percent in cash rent. The 
ratio based on the shadow price of land (marginal productivity of land) was 5.3 
percent. It is noted that these ratios are ones in the midst of the green revolution in 
Pakistan Punjab, which might have pushed the short-run R/P ratio somewhat upward. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that these ratios are more or less in line with the R/P 
ratios observed during the British period. The author presumes that the effects have 
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been positive and increasing, thereby reducing the R/P ratio much lower than the 
market interest rate. The study raises questions with respect to the direction of public 
investment, land tax policy, and the growing disparity between rent receivers and 
rent payers. Another study by Renkow covers the period 1960-89. In this study, the 
land price data were collected from 37 irrigated villages and 42 rainfed villages in 
the Pakistan Punjab which were away from the urban centres in order to avoid urban 
influence. The data on rent were not collected from the surveyed villages, but 
borrowed from the Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI) data collected in 
other villages. Therefore, the R/P ratios are not strictly comparable. The study shows 
that the R/P ratio in the rainfed villages had declined from 2.85 percent in 1960 to 
1.98 percent in 1989, and from 3.93 percent to 2.59 percent in the irrigated villages. 
The study confirms the faster increase of land price than rent in general, and the 
faster increase of rent than land price during the green revolution period (1976–86). 
The study also found out that the 70 percent of the incremental portion of land price 
was explained by the technological innovation, and that the disparity between rainfed 
and irrigated villages has been narrowed mainly due to influence of remittance 
money from the oil producing countries in the rainfed villages. 
Pakistan has had numerous attempts at carrying out land reforms. Most 
observers, however, are unanimous that these reforms failed to achieve the desired 
goals. A political economy approach is essential for understanding the failure of land 
reform efforts and distortions in agricultural input and output markets. South Asia 
features an asymmetry between small and large farmers in the political as well as the 
economic sphere. Indeed, it is access to political power that has upset the functioning 
of key markets (notably land and water) in South Asia, and markets cannot be 
studied in isolation from these political considerations. Policy distortions or market 
imperfections can create a bias towards large farms, allowing them to persist as such, 
despite their inefficiency. Several examples can be cited here. First, price policy or 
farm subsidies may favour large farmers. Second, concentrated landownership may 
reduce the amount of land available for sale at any time. A feature of Pakistan more 
so than other South Asian countries is highly concentrated landownership and an 
associated “feudal” social structure. Large inefficient farm persist because their 
owners have little interest in profit-maximisation. Land is instead held for political 
power or prestige, and, if sold at all, is sold in large parcels to other large 
landowners. 
Land fragmentation, as distinguished from farm size, has also been considered 
as a source of productivity loss, but these losses have not been quantified, and 
reasons for the persistence of fragmentation are poorly understood. It seems clear in 
principle that land fragmentation would lower productivity by raising transports 
costs between fields, and preventing the realisation of economies of scale. 
Additionally, the hedges or other boundaries between plots may result in a 
significant loss of arable land. However, Binswanger (1994) cautions that the 
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influence of fragmentation on productivity can be overstated. Consolidation by sale 
to someone outside the family is complicated by the right of pre-emption or right of 
first refusal which family members enjoy on inherited land. Equally important, 
transaction costs may inhibit the transfer of small plots, even when all parties would 
be willing to carry out the transaction. Finally for reasons already outlined, land 
markets may be extremely thin. An offer to sell land may result in a large fall in the 
price of land; the opposite holds with an offer to buy. Once we acknowledge the 
presence of transaction costs, than the past history of land distribution becomes 
relevant for understanding the current situation. There are a variety of reasons why a 
history of community landownership may have resulted in fragmented plots which 
has not been undone even if land rights are now allocated individually [Heston and 
Kumar (1983)]. 
High transaction costs are viewed as a significant impediment to the 
functioning of land markets. Transfers of land rights are complicated in South Asian 
land markets by lack of explicit title to land, and informal and customary rights. This 
hypothesis can be seen as either an independent hypothesis or as a by-product of the 
others, which are indicative of substantial barriers to access to land in South Asia. 
However, recent evidence does point to some dynamism in South Asian land 
markets. Recent trends in Pakistan and India indicate that middle-sized farms are 
taking in land from those at each end of the distribution. Informal rights should not 
necessarily be seen as an impediment to a well-functioning land market. Indeed, a 
potential problem relating to land rights in the liberalised environment is that the 
customary rights on which farmers depend may be eroded.  South Asian agriculture 
has a considerable array of customary rights (many of which protect small farmers), 
which are not always recognised in common law. 
 
III.  A PROFILE OF CHANGING LAND MARKET IN PAKISTAN 
The discussion in the previous section had highlighted the role of ownership 
and tenancy relationships for the productivity—land size relationships in rural 
Pakistan. Despite land reforms introduced since 1947, weak implementation of such 
reforms measures has not changed drastically the defacto agrarian relations on the 
ground although dejure agrarian  relationships have undergone a drastic change as a 
result of land reforms introduced in independent Pakistan. Informal relationships 
between land owners and land users are important determinants of resource use 
efficiency. 
 
(i)  Tenurial Relations 
Pakistan had inherited two main land-tenure systems with some regional 
variations between different provinces. Locus of landownership and extent of 
inequitable distribution of land distinguish the two systems from each other. The 
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samindari system and the peasant-proprietor land systems were the two systems. The 
intent of the land reforms measures was to move towards the later system with 
protection of rights for the tenants who were the actual cultivators of land. 
Under the samindari system, there were two sub-systems. Jagirdars were 
given revenue-free land estates by the government. The land owned by Jagirdars 
was generally cultivated by tenants and share-croppers. Tenants were of two 
kinds i.e. occupancy tenants or tenants-at-will. The occupancy tenants had 
permanent, heritable and transferable rights to cultivate the Jagir lands. Tenants-
at-will had no such legal rights. The second group of zamindars had to pay land 
tax to government. They used to engage both occupancy tenants and tenants-at-
will for cultivation of their land. Sindh was the province where this system was 
generally prevalent with dominant category of tenants being tenants-at-will. 
These tenants are called haris in local language. The tenancy reforms introduced 
in 1950 had given protection to tenants-at-will. Implementation of these laws has 
been very weak. 
The other land-tenure system is that of peasant-proprietorship. The peasants 
enjoy landownership rights and cultivate land mostly on their own account by 
employing family labour and/or hired labour. 
In the zamindari system, landlords owned and controlled the use of their land. 
Tenants had no legal rights. Most zamindars had parceled out land in small lots to 
tenants for cultivation. Zamindars used to hire a supervisor for looking after their 
land affairs. The tenants provided their labour and a pair of oxen for cultivation of 
land.  50 percent of produce was given to the landlords as rent of the land. Contracts 
were mostly verbal and lasted for no more than a year at a time.  Landlords used to 
shift around the tenants on their lands so that no individual was listed on a particular 
plot for more than one year. In Punjab and NWFP, occupancy tenants had legal 
protection. Tenants-at-will will had no effective protection. In addition to paying half 
of produce as rents, tenants had also to provide some services to the landlord free 
from any remuneration of their labour. 
In Table 1, we provide information on the relative importance of owner-
operated and tenanted area by farm size. This table also provides information on the 
tenancy contracts i.e. being share-cropped, leased on fixed rent and on other terms 
for the census years of 1990 and 2000. The share of operated area increased from 
76.2 percent in 1990 to 81.4 percent in 2000. The dominant form of tenancy 
contracts is that of share-cropping. Fixed leases are about 25 percent of the total 
tenancy contracts. There are some minor variations between provinces but the 
picture described above persists for all provinces. The increasing importance of 
owner-operation and the reliance on sharecropping are two well-established 
tendencies. The tendency for self-cultivation is due to fear of further land reforms 
and the increasing spread of capitalist farming. The persistence of share-cropping is 
mainly explained in terms of protection against risks. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Operated Area by Ownership and Tenancy Contracts, Pakistan 
% Rented Out 
Sharecropping 
Owner- 
operated 
Share- 
cropping Leased Other 
Operated Area (Acres) 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
     <5 77.3 80.7 17.4 14.5 4.8 4.5 0.5 0.3 
5–<12.5 65.3 75.2 27.5 18.6 6.6 5.8 0.6 0.3 
12.5–<25 68.6 75.9 22.9 17.2 8.1 6.5 0.5 0.4 
25–<50 73.7 81.0 18.0 12.9 7.8 5.6 0.5 0.5 
50–<150 82.0 85.2 10.3 10.0 7.1 4.4 0.6 0.4 
      <150 90.4 90.1 4.1 4.7 4.8 3.9 0.7 1.3 
Total 76.2 81.4 16.7 13.0 6.5 5.1 0.6 0.5 
Source:  Data from Census of Agriculture, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, Government of 
Pakistan, Islamabad.   
 
(ii)  Pattern of Landownership 
Landownership in Pakistan and its provinces is highly skewed. The inequality 
in landownership has increased over time. Table 2  presents the Gini coefficient of 
ownership holdings for four years i.e. 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 2 
Gini Coefficient for Ownership Holding 
 1972 1980 1990 2000 
Pakistan 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.75 
Punjab 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.71 
NWFP 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.86 
Sindh 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.67 
Balochistan 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.68 
Source: Government of Pakistan (Various Issues) Agriculture Census Reports.   
 
The Gini coefficient increases from 0.66 in 1972 to 0.75 in 2000 for Pakistan. 
A sharp increase in inequality is found for two provinces of Punjab and NWFP. In 
the case of Sindh and Balochistan, the Gini coefficient decreases slightly. However, 
it should be noted that the extent of inequality in landownership in all provinces and 
Pakistan is quite high. There is also a difference in the pattern of land distribution 
over time. The Gini coefficient for Pakistan remains constant till 1990 and increased 
sharply in 2000. In Sindh and Balochistan, the fall in the coefficient is sustained 
throughout the period. 
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(iii)  Trends in Operated Area by Tenure and Farm Size 
The Gini coefficients given in Table 3 show a high degree of inequality in the 
distribution of operational holdings. However, the concentration in access to land use 
is less concentrated than is the case for landownership. But for all tenurial classes 
taken together, the distributions in the NWFP and Balochistan are more unequal 
those in Sindh, the Punjab and overall Pakistan.  The distribution of operational 
holdings worsened somewhat between the 1972-2000 period. 
Among the different tenurial classes, the distribution of farm area among 
farms of various sizes has been relatively more unequal under owner-operated farms. 
Among the different tenurial classes, the distribution of farm area among farms of 
various sizes has been relatively more unequal under owner-operated farms. 
 
Table 3 
Gini Coefficient for Operated Area, by Mode of Tenancy 
Type of Tenancy 
Total Operated
 Area 
Owner- 
operated 
Owner-tenant
Operated 
Tenant-  
operated 
1972         
Pakistan 0.52 0.61 0.47 0.40 
Punjab 0.49 0.58 0.43 0.40 
NWFP 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.61 
Sindh 0.43 0.57 0.46 0.32 
Balochistan 0.64 0.68 0.61 0.47 
1980         
Pakistan 0.53 0.60 0.47 0.40 
Punjab 0.51 0.58 0.44 0.40 
NWFP 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.53 
Sindh 0.47 0.54 0.47 0.33 
Balochistan 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.42 
1990         
Pakistan 0.61 0.62 0.49 0.44 
Punjab 0.55 0.59 0.47 0.44 
NWFP 0.61 0.62 0.55  0.5 
Sindh 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.34 
Balochistan 0.63 0.66 0.52 0.44 
2000         
Pakistan 0.61 0.61 0.46 0.47 
Punjab 0.57 0.58 0.47 0.49 
NWFP 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.48 
Sindh 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.46 
Balochistan 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.46 
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study was intended to provide a description and analysis of different 
facets of land market and identify the major constraints in the proper functioning of 
this market.  The study was based mainly on the previous studies.  The data from 
different Agricultural Censuses were used to profile the pattern of land distribution 
and land use.  The major findings of the study are briefly summarised. 
First, the relationship between farm size and productivity measured through the 
profit frontier approach or through simple regression equation between farm size and 
production per acre is found to vary between different studies.  The inverse relationship 
between farm size and output per acre is a recurrent feature found in data.  This is 
apparently due to land-labour interactions.  Small farmers have a lower opportunity 
cost of labour, can exploit more marginal land, cultivate a larger proportion of their 
land and as a result achieve higher output and yields.  On the other hand, small farmers 
are more credit-constrained and large farmers less so.  A low effective price of capital 
for large farmers leads to substitution of machines for labour. The large farmers use 
capital intensive inputs.  Depending on which effect is dominant, one can get inverse 
relationship, positive relationship or a U-shaped curve.  The review of studies provides 
examples of each relationship.  One needs to be cautious in drawing public policy 
implications for land reforms of the redistributive type.  The impact of land distribution 
on production and equity would depend on the complementary policies for the supply 
of modern inputs and their interface with the land distribution. 
Second, the importance of secure titles to land as well as protection of the 
tenants for their prescribed share in inputs and outputs is obvious.  However, we did 
not find much empirical work on these aspects in Pakistan.  The importance of share-
cropping as the most preferred farm of tenancy emerges clearly from the data.  The 
literature on factors responsible for this result is patchy, however. 
Third, the participation in land market is by and large excluded for tenants, 
landless and small farmers.  These groups are excluded from the land market due to 
severe credit constraints they face to buy land.  They do not have enough savings of 
their own and do not have suitable collateral to pledge for getting access to credit.  
Insecurity of land tenure arrangements and almost zero probability of buying land 
has reduced this segment of rural population to be condemned to the lower strata in 
rural areas.  The only course left for them is to turn to the labour market—with or 
without skill development or to engage in activities like animal raising which are not 
land-based but are labour-intensive for the landless households. 
Fourth, the concentration of land was high at the time of creation of Pakistan.  
Despite few attempts at land distribution, the Gini coefficient for ownership holdings 
has gone up from 0.66 in 1972 to 00.75 in 2000.  It has increased for the provinces of 
Punjab and NWFP considerably but has shown a modest decline in Sindh and 
Balochistan.  This outcome is due to the unequalising nature of land distribution 
through private land market. 
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Fifth, misguided land reforms which had fixed a ceiling on land holdings and 
the lowering of this ceiling over time in three land reforms of 1959, 1972 and 1977 
had made tenancy unattractive to land owners.  Land was split between members of 
the family to avoid giving land to government and land previously sharecropped was 
resumed by landlords for self-cultivation.  This was accompanied by capital-
intensive farming resulting in lesser employment opportunities for landless labour. 
Last but not the least, the study spells out the key aspects of the nature of 
land market in Pakistan’s context. In view of the fact that the ongoing interest 
rate is generally higher than the rate of return on land investment as long as the 
land is used for farming, it is not possible for the prospective farmers, without 
initial capital at hand, to participate in the land market. In other words, land 
markets are open only for those who are enjoying excess liquidity in the form of 
rental income. The higher growth rate of land value than productivity growth 
implies that the land value is no longer the discounted value of rent as postulated 
in the conventional theory. This land-rent relationship has assured the continuous 
flow of capital gains for rent receivers and continuously squeezed the rent payers 
out of the land market. 
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